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dc.creatorCastro, Lauren
dc.creatorRamirez-Polo, Luis Eduardo
dc.creatorNeira Rodado, Dionicio
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-16T20:06:53Z
dc.date.available2020-08-16T20:06:53Z
dc.date.issued2020-08
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11323/6934
dc.description.abstractBahinipati et al. (2009) [16] proponen un plan de reparto de ingresos y participantes de coaliciones en el mercado eléctrico de la Industria de semiconductores. Como resultado de la investigación se concluyó que el beneficio total derivado del mecanismo desarrollado, incrementaba con el número de eslabones de la Cadena de Suministro. Ahmadi y Hoseinpour (2011) [17] estudian la coordinación de decisiones de publicidad en conjunto de una cadena de suministro conformada por Fabricante y Minorista, utilizando distintos modelos propios de la Teoría de juegos y analizando las posibles acciones de cada jugador dado ciertos escenarios.spa
dc.language.isospaspa
dc.publisherCorporación Universidad de la Costaspa
dc.rightsCC0 1.0 Universal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/*
dc.sourceUniversidad de la Costaspa
dc.subjectMercado eléctrico de la Industria de semiconductoresspa
dc.subjectCadena de suministrospa
dc.subjectFabricante y minoristaspa
dc.titleEstado del arte para un sistema de información para la valoración estratégica y financiera de las empresas que desean cooperar en un clúster, basada en el valor de shapleyspa
dc.typearticlespa
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dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersionspa
dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessspa


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