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Estado del arte para un sistema de información para la valoración estratégica y financiera de las empresas que desean cooperar en un clúster, basada en el valor de shapley
dc.contributor.author | Castro, Lauren | spa |
dc.contributor.author | Ramirez-Polo, Luis Eduardo | spa |
dc.contributor.author | Neira Rodado, Dionicio | spa |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-08-16T20:06:53Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-08-16T20:06:53Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2020-08 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11323/6934 | spa |
dc.description.abstract | Bahinipati et al. (2009) [16] proponen un plan de reparto de ingresos y participantes de coaliciones en el mercado eléctrico de la Industria de semiconductores. Como resultado de la investigación se concluyó que el beneficio total derivado del mecanismo desarrollado, incrementaba con el número de eslabones de la Cadena de Suministro. Ahmadi y Hoseinpour (2011) [17] estudian la coordinación de decisiones de publicidad en conjunto de una cadena de suministro conformada por Fabricante y Minorista, utilizando distintos modelos propios de la Teoría de juegos y analizando las posibles acciones de cada jugador dado ciertos escenarios. | spa |
dc.language.iso | spa | |
dc.publisher | Corporación Universidad de la Costa | spa |
dc.rights | CC0 1.0 Universal | spa |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ | spa |
dc.source | Universidad de la Costa | spa |
dc.subject | Mercado eléctrico de la Industria de semiconductores | spa |
dc.subject | Cadena de suministro | spa |
dc.subject | Fabricante y minorista | spa |
dc.title | Estado del arte para un sistema de información para la valoración estratégica y financiera de las empresas que desean cooperar en un clúster, basada en el valor de shapley | spa |
dc.type | Artículo de revista | spa |
dc.rights.accessrights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | spa |
dc.identifier.instname | Corporación Universidad de la Costa | spa |
dc.identifier.reponame | REDICUC - Repositorio CUC | spa |
dc.identifier.repourl | https://repositorio.cuc.edu.co/ | spa |
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dc.relation.references | [36] Ramirez-Rios, D. G., Rodriguez Pinto, C., Visbal Martinez, J., Monroy Silvera, F., De la Cruz Hernández, J., Donoso Meisel, Y., & Paternina Arboleda, C. D. (2016). A bi-criteria optimization model for parallel machine scheduling: game theoretic vs genetic algorithms. IJMSOR: International Journal of Management Science & Operation Research, 1(1), 20-30. Retrieved from http://ijmsoridi.com/index.php/ijmsor/article/view/73 | spa |
dc.relation.references | [37] Landinez-Lamadrid, D. C., Ramirez-Ríos, D. G., Neira Rodado, D., Parra Negrete, K., & Combita Niño, J. P. (2017). Shapley Value: its algorithms and application to supply chains. INGE CUC, 13(1), 61-69. https://doi.org/10.17981/ingecuc.13.1.2017.06 | spa |
dc.type.coar | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | spa |
dc.type.content | Text | spa |
dc.type.driver | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | spa |
dc.type.redcol | http://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ART | spa |
dc.type.version | info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion | spa |
dc.type.coarversion | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa | spa |
dc.rights.coar | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | spa |
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