Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem

dc.contributor.authorCastro, Laurenspa
dc.contributor.authorRamirez-Polo, Luis Eduardospa
dc.contributor.authorNeira Rodado, Dioniciospa
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-16T20:06:53Z
dc.date.available2020-08-16T20:06:53Z
dc.date.issued2020-08
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11323/6934spa
dc.description.abstractBahinipati et al. (2009) [16] proponen un plan de reparto de ingresos y participantes de coaliciones en el mercado eléctrico de la Industria de semiconductores. Como resultado de la investigación se concluyó que el beneficio total derivado del mecanismo desarrollado, incrementaba con el número de eslabones de la Cadena de Suministro. Ahmadi y Hoseinpour (2011) [17] estudian la coordinación de decisiones de publicidad en conjunto de una cadena de suministro conformada por Fabricante y Minorista, utilizando distintos modelos propios de la Teoría de juegos y analizando las posibles acciones de cada jugador dado ciertos escenarios.spa
dc.language.isospa
dc.publisherCorporación Universidad de la Costaspa
dc.rightsCC0 1.0 Universalspa
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/spa
dc.sourceUniversidad de la Costaspa
dc.subjectMercado eléctrico de la Industria de semiconductoresspa
dc.subjectCadena de suministrospa
dc.subjectFabricante y minoristaspa
dc.titleEstado del arte para un sistema de información para la valoración estratégica y financiera de las empresas que desean cooperar en un clúster, basada en el valor de shapleyspa
dc.typeArtículo de revistaspa
dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessspa
dc.identifier.instnameCorporación Universidad de la Costaspa
dc.identifier.reponameREDICUC - Repositorio CUCspa
dc.identifier.repourlhttps://repositorio.cuc.edu.co/spa
dc.relation.references[1] OWEN, Guillermo. "Game Theory". San Diego: Academic Press.1995. 447p.spa
dc.relation.references[2] RAY (1989), Credible coalitions and the core, Internat J. Game Theory, 18, 185-187.spa
dc.relation.references[3] CHWE M.S.-Y. (1994) , Farsighted Coalitional Stability. J. Economic Theory, 63, 299-325.spa
dc.relation.references[4] XUE, L. (1998), Coalitional Stability under perfect foresight. Economic Theory, 11, 603- 627.spa
dc.relation.references[5] RAY, D. & VOHRA, R. (1999) A Theory of endogenous coalition structures. Games Econom. Behav. 26, 286-336.spa
dc.relation.references[6] DIAMANTOUDI, E. & XUE, L. (2007), Coalitions, agreements and efficiency. J. Economic Theory, 136, 105-125.spa
dc.relation.references[7] RAY (2007), A Game Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation, Lipsey Lectures, Oxford University Press, Oxford.spa
dc.relation.references[8] GORADIA, H., & VIDAL, J. (2007). An Equal Excess Negotiation Algorithm for Coalition Formation. AAMAS'07 (p. 3p.). Honolulu: IFAAMAS.spa
dc.relation.references[9] SHEHORY, O., & KRAUS, S. Coalition formation among autonomous agents: Strategies and complexity. Ramat Gan, Israel: Bar Ilan University.spa
dc.relation.references[10] LEHRER, E & SCARSINI M. (2011), On the core of dynamic cooperative games, 27p. URL: http://www.math.tau.ac.il/~lehrer/Papers/Dynamic-cooperative.pdfspa
dc.relation.references[11] SANDHOLM, T. & LESSER, V. R. (1997), Coalitions among computationally bounded agents, Artificial Intelligence 94(1): 99-137.spa
dc.relation.references[12] CONITZER, V. & SANDHOLM, T (2004), Computing Shapley values, manipulating value division schemes, and checking core membership in multi-issue domains, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 219-225.spa
dc.relation.references[13] BARTHOLDI, John J. and KEMAHLIOGLU-ZIYA, Using Shapley Value to Allocate Savings in a Supply Chain, Atlanta: Georgia Institute of Technology, June 2004.spa
dc.relation.references[14] CACHON, Gerard and LARIVIERE, Martin, Supply Chain Coordination with RevenueSharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, Management Science, Vol. 51, No. 1. (Jan., 2005), pp. 30-44spa
dc.relation.references[15] CACHON, Gerard and NETESSINE, Sergei, Game Theory in Supply Chain Analysis, University of Pennsylvania, Ch2, 46p.spa
dc.relation.references[16] Bahinipati et al., Revenue sharing in semiconductor industry supply chain: Cooperative game theoretic approach, "Sadhana" Vol. 34, No. 3, Junio 2009, pp. 501-527.spa
dc.relation.references[17] Ahmadi y Hoseinpour, A Game-Theoretic Analysis for Coordinating Cooperative Advertising in a Supply Chain, "Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications" (2011) Vol. 149, pp 138-150.spa
dc.relation.references[18] Ang et al., Establishing Nash equilibrium of the manufacturer-supplier game in supply chain management, "Journal of Global Optimization" (2013). Vol. 56, pp 1297-1312.spa
dc.relation.references[19] Hong y Chen, Game Theory Analysis of Quality Control in Two-Echelon Supply Chain, "Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University" (2013). Vol. 18, No. 4, pp 508-512.spa
dc.relation.references[20] S. Alaei et.al., A game theoretical study of cooperative advertising in a singlemanufacturer-two-retailers supply chain, "The International Journal of Advanced Manufacturing Technology" Springer London, 2014.spa
dc.relation.references[21] Tan, G. y Wang, R. "Coalition formation in the presence of continuing conflict" International Journal of Game Theory (2010), Vol. 39 , pp 273-279. Springer-Verlag 2009.spa
dc.relation.references[22] Wood, P. "Climate change and Game theory", Annals of the New York Academy of sciences (2012) Vol. 1219, pp 153-170. Springer-Verlag 2011.spa
dc.relation.references[23] Bolton, G. y Brosig, J. "How do coalitions get built? Evidence from an extensive form coalition game with and without communication" International Journal of Game Theory (2012). Vol. 41, pp 623-649.spa
dc.relation.references[24] Elomri, et al. "Coalition Formation and Cost allocation for Joint Replenishment Systems" Production and Operation Management. Vol. 21 No. 6, pp 1015-1027, ISSN 1059-1478, EISSN 1937-5956. Production and Operation Managemen Society, 2012.spa
dc.relation.references[25]Boongasame, L. y Daneshgar, F. "A collaborative platform for a buyer coalition: Introducing the Awareness-based Buyer Coalition (ABC) system". Information Systems Frontier (2013). Vol 15, pp 89-98. Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011.spa
dc.relation.references[26] Buchbinder et al., Non-Cooperative Cost Sharing Games via Subsidies, "Theory of Computing Systems" (2010). Vol. 47, pp 15-37 Springerspa
dc.relation.references[27] Jafar et al., The non-cooperative game theory for trades in B2B electronic market, "International Journal of Advanced Manufacturing Technology"(2012). Vol. 48, pp 823- 828.spa
dc.relation.references[28] Facchinei, et al., Non-cooperative games with minmax objectives, " Computational Optimization and Applications" Springer Science+Business Media. New York, 2014.spa
dc.relation.references[29] Okaie, Y. y Nakano, T., Non-cooperative optimization games in market-oriented overlay networks: an integrated model of resource pricing and network formation, "Frontiers of Computer Science" (2011). Vol. 5, pp 496-505.spa
dc.relation.references[30] Facchinei et al., Nash Equilibrium Seeking in Noncooperative Games, "IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control". Vol. 57, No. 5, pp 1192-1207.spa
dc.relation.references[31] Driessen, T. , Associated consistency and values for TU games. "International Journal of Game Theory" (2010). Vol 39, pp 467-482.spa
dc.relation.references[32] Rêgo, L. y Halpern, J., Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players. "International Journal of Game Theory" (2012). Vol. 41, pp 131-155.spa
dc.relation.references[33] Béal, et al. Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games, "International Journal of Game Theory" (2012). Vol. 41 pp 157-178. Springer-Verlag 2011.spa
dc.relation.references[34] Rhoads y Bartholdi . Computer Solution to the Game of Pure Strategy. "Games 2012" Vol. 3, pp 150-156. ISSN 2073-4336spa
dc.relation.references[35] Manuel et al. Players indifferent to cooperate and characterizations of the Shapley value, "Mathematical Methods of Operation Research" (2013). Vol. 77, pp 1-14 Springer.spa
dc.relation.references[36] Ramirez-Rios, D. G., Rodriguez Pinto, C., Visbal Martinez, J., Monroy Silvera, F., De la Cruz Hernández, J., Donoso Meisel, Y., & Paternina Arboleda, C. D. (2016). A bi-criteria optimization model for parallel machine scheduling: game theoretic vs genetic algorithms. IJMSOR: International Journal of Management Science & Operation Research, 1(1), 20-30. Retrieved from http://ijmsoridi.com/index.php/ijmsor/article/view/73spa
dc.relation.references[37] Landinez-Lamadrid, D. C., Ramirez-Ríos, D. G., Neira Rodado, D., Parra Negrete, K., & Combita Niño, J. P. (2017). Shapley Value: its algorithms and application to supply chains. INGE CUC, 13(1), 61-69. https://doi.org/10.17981/ingecuc.13.1.2017.06spa
dc.type.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501spa
dc.type.contentTextspa
dc.type.driverinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlespa
dc.type.redcolhttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARTspa
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionspa
dc.type.coarversionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aaspa
dc.rights.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2spa


Ficheros en el ítem

Thumbnail
Thumbnail

Este ítem aparece en la(s) siguiente(s) colección(ones)

  • Artículos científicos [3120]
    Artículos de investigación publicados por miembros de la comunidad universitaria.

Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem

CC0 1.0 Universal
Excepto si se señala otra cosa, la licencia del ítem se describe como CC0 1.0 Universal